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Abstract 58 
Do children attribute mortality and other life-cycle traits to all minded beings?  The present 59 
study examined whether culture influences young children’s ability to conceptualize and 60 
differentiate human beings from supernatural beings (such as God) in terms of life-cycle 61 
traits.  Three-to-5-year-old Israeli and British children were questioned whether their mother, 62 
a friend, and God would be subject to various life-cycle processes: birth, death, aging, 63 
existence/longevity, and parentage.  Children did not anthropomorphize but differentiated 64 
among human and supernatural beings, attributing life-cycle traits to humans but not to God. 65 
Although three-year-olds differentiated significantly among agents, five-year-olds attributed 66 
correct life-cycle traits more consistently than younger children.  Results also indicated some 67 
cross-cultural variation in these attributions.  Implications for biological conceptual 68 
development are discussed. 69 
Keywords: Cognitive development; folk biology; cultural learning; cross-cultural 70 
comparisons; naïve biology; reasoning; anthropomorphism 71 
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 94 
 95 
Will Superman die? If Superman is conceptualized as a human, a likely response 96 
would be that Superman will die someday.  If he is conceptualized as another category of 97 
being that does not conform to the biological system that humans and other animals share, it 98 
could be that Superman will live forever.  As children develop and experience the natural 99 
world, they learn to classify the beings and objects they come into contact with and make 100 
basic intuitive inferences based upon their classifications (Gelman & Markman, 1986). 101 
However, children live in a world where they encounter both biological kinds (e.g., animals 102 
and plants) and supernatural beings, such as Superman or God, who children learn about 103 
through some form of cultural input.  Supernatural beings pose a challenge to children’s 104 
biological classification. They have the markers of ordinary living things (e.g., having eyes or 105 
having a human form, etc.) but also have certain category-defying properties (e.g., 106 
invisibility, living forever). Do natural biological attributions apply given that these beings 107 
can be super-natural? Addressing children’s acquisition of biological traits in a diverse set of 108 
beings may shed light on the influence of social and cultural input on children’s 109 
understanding of living things. 110 
Developmental psychologists have long been interested in how children acquire 111 
knowledge about living things.  Research has documented that between 3- and 5-years-of-112 
age, children appreciate that human and non-human animals share fundamental biological 113 
processes (e.g., birth, growth, and death) (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Atran, 1998; Barrett & 114 
Behne, 2005; Bering, 2002; Carey, 1985; Coley, 2007; Hatano et al., 1993; Inagaki & 115 
Hatano, 1996; Keil, 2007; Opfer & Siegler, 2004).  For example, preschool-aged children are 116 
able to classify and differentiate that humans and other animals are born and grow older but 117 
artifacts do not (Heyman, Phillips, & Gelman, 2003; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & 118 
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McCormick, 1991; Saylor, Somanader, Levin, & Kawamura, 2010).  Developmentalists have 119 
concluded that these attributions are largely dependent on an intuitive understanding of 120 
biology that develops across the preschool period and these intuitions incline children to 121 
attribute biological properties to animate beings over inanimate ones. 122 
How, then, do children understand beings that diverge from plants and animals in 123 
terms of their alleged biological properties (or lack thereof)? The inferences that supernatural 124 
beings provoke may challenge typical folk biological attributions.  An investigation of 125 
children’s intuitions regarding supernatural beings is compelling because these entities 126 
present an unusual hybrid of living and non-living traits.  Many supernatural beings, such as 127 
ghosts and God, are not strictly biological and are unusual because they are animate but 128 
cannot be seen. Children learn about these entities through testimony and socio-cultural input 129 
(Harris & Corriveau, 2014; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2012, 2014), 130 
yet evidence is not clear whether children rely upon intuitive biological reasoning to 131 
determine whether these beings conform to the biological processes of the natural world.  132 
Certainly, not all supernatural beings are completely non-biological (e.g., Superman, Jesus).  133 
And, despite decades of research exploring children’s ability to classify biological beings, 134 
questions still remain.  One such question is how broadly biological reasoning is applied to 135 
supernatural beings or whether children use other strategies or cultural knowledge to 136 
conceptualize these beings. 137 
Some exploration of this question has already begun.  According to research 138 
investigating children’s earliest intuitions of the biological world, we might expect preschool-139 
aged children to reason about minded supernatural beings (i.e., persons) via 140 
anthropomorphism: assuming other animate things are like humans regarding biological traits 141 
(Carey, 1985, 1999; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002, 2006; Piaget, 1929). In this stance, preschool-142 
aged children begin to form inferences about non-human beings by using a human prototype. 143 
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The development of a mature understanding of the biological system requires fundamental 144 
conceptual change as children learn about the natural world and move from a human-centered 145 
model to a folk-biological model.  Researchers propose that this human-based model is useful 146 
because humans share biological properties with other animals and this model can be applied 147 
as an analogy to think about the biology of other entities (Carey, 1985, 1995; Coley, 1995, 148 
2007; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002, 2006; Keil, 2007). 149 
Recent evidence has challenged this framework (Herrmann, Waxman, & Medin, 150 
2010; Medin, Waxman, Woodring, & Washinawatok, 2010; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007). 151 
In a group of studies 4-year-olds demonstrated flexibility and differentiated between robots 152 
(an example of a hybrid entity who is both animate and non-biological) and living things 153 
(Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Okita, Schwartz, Shibata, & Tokuda, 2007; Saylor et al., 2010).  154 
This research suggests that children may be resistant to anthropomorphism as children 155 
acknowledged that animate artifacts such as robots share certain features of living things 156 
(e.g., seeing or thinking) but ultimately concluded they are not living.  In another study, 157 
Herrmann and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that urban U.S. American 3-year-olds did not 158 
use humans as an analogy to reason about the biological traits of non-human animals.  159 
Herrmann and colleagues (2010) told children that people (or animals) have novel properties 160 
(e.g., “andro”) inside them, and wanted to see if children would attribute these properties to 161 
other animals, plants and artifacts.   Three-year-olds attributed novel biological properties to 162 
both human and non-human animals regardless of condition.  Five-year-olds matched prior 163 
results (Carey, 1985), in that they were more likely to attribute novel properties from a person 164 
to other animals rather than attribute novel properties of an animal to a person.  Herrmann 165 
and colleagues (2010) concluded that anthropomorphism is an acquired perspective, 166 
appearing sometime between 3- and 5-years-old. 167 
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Based on this work, we might expect young children to have more flexibility with 168 
regard to biological reasoning in supernatural agents than strict anthropomorphism might 169 
predict.  Prior work has shown differences in children’s biological reasoning based on their 170 
education and culture (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Ross, Medin, & Cox, 2007; Tarlowski, 2006; 171 
Waxman et al., 2007). Thus, we might expect some variation in children’s ability to reason 172 
about life-cycle traits based on their exposure to certain traits, like death, and their knowledge 173 
about the being in question.   174 
We are aware of only one study that has directly asked children to reason about the 175 
life-cycle traits of a supernatural being.  Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005) asked 3-to-5-176 
year-old Spanish children from both religious and non-religious schools four questions 177 
regarding various life-cycle traits of a friend and God: 1) “When there were dinosaurs in the 178 
world, did ____exist?”, 2) “Will _____get older and older or stay the same?”, 3) “Will 179 
____die or go on living forever and ever?”, and 4) “Was ____a little baby a long time ago?” 180 
Answers to these four questions were summed for a “mortality” index score.  Four- and 5-181 
year-olds consistently differentiated between biological and non-biological beings, attributing 182 
“mortality” to humans and immortality to God. In contrast, 3-year-olds did not clearly 183 
distinguish between God and their friend.  Although older children differentiated between 184 
agents, im/mortality scores for God in all age groups were at chance levels, a score of 2 (out 185 
of 4).   186 
Although results from this initial study are intriguing, this study raises two issues.  187 
First, although 3-year-olds did not reliably distinguish between biological beings and God 188 
(Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005), there is evidence that children of this age can distinguish 189 
between living and non-living entities (Heyman et al., 2003; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Saylor 190 
et al., 2010).  Also, older children in their sample could differentiate between the agents, but 191 
their scores for God were close to chance.  Questions remain whether children were at chance 192 
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because of lack of understanding of God, immature cognitive development, or both.  As 193 
suggested above, religious or other cultural input may influence how children understand 194 
supernatural beings.  Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005) interviewed children in Spain, a place that 195 
retains a strong Catholic cultural heritage, where Christmas and Easter are celebrated as 196 
national holidays, and Mary is commonly referred to as “the Mother of God.”  197 
Anthropomorphism of God, particularly in the person of Jesus, is theologically sanctioned in 198 
a sense.  If Spanish children answered the questions using God as Jesus, then God once was a 199 
baby and did die.  To better test whether culture plays a role in children’s understanding of 200 
the biology of supernatural beings, it is important to compare these results with a cultural 201 
context in which a fully anthropomorphic deity is resisted, such as in Judaism. God, in the 202 
Jewish tradition, is regarded as not having had parents, not having been a baby, not growing 203 
older with time, and never dying (Armstrong, 1993).  If children in both a predominantly 204 
Jewish culture and a predominantly Christian one both begin to attribute life-cycle traits to 205 
humans and God simultaneously, it would be strong evidence that understanding the life-206 
cycle aspects of the human experience are conceptually linked. 207 
A second issue is that Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005) operationalized 208 
“mortality” as a composite score of four questions concerning: death, existence/longevity, 209 
aging, and babyhood.  However, these questions index more accurately attribution of life-210 
cycle traits.  Both living forever/death and existence/longevity index immortality/mortality 211 
better than aging and babyhood which index more life-cycle traits.  Further inclusion of other 212 
life-cycle traits (such as parentage) in this index would be interesting to index how much 213 
children attribute various traits to supernatural and human beings.  Additionally, “mortality” 214 
was only examined as a composite score and Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005) did not 215 
report analyses of each item individually.  Examination of individual items would be 216 
important to assess possible developmental differences in responses to each life-cycle trait. 217 
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The present study  218 
This study examines cultural differences in children’s understanding of biology in a 219 
diverse set of agents. To address the possibility that cultural representations of God impact 220 
children’s tendency to anthropomorphize, we broadened the population to include children in 221 
two different countries with different national religions. We compared participants from a 222 
Jewish cultural context (Israel) with those from a traditionally Christian cultural context 223 
(UK).  We expected that Modern Orthodox Jewish Israeli children, of a culture in which God 224 
was never a baby, did not have parents, and never did die, would distinguish between an 225 
immortal God and mortal humans.  In a Christian context, where Easter depicts Jesus’ death 226 
and at Christmas Jesus was a baby and had parents, we predicted that children may be unable 227 
to differentiate God from human agents until they fully understand these culturally-learned 228 
concepts. To investigate whether British participants distinguish between two supernatural 229 
entities that are and are not subject to regular life-cycle traits, we included questions about 230 
God and Jesus. We hoped the contrast between Jesus and God would highlight differential 231 
cultural input about both supernatural beings.  We speculated that by including Jesus and God 232 
as separate beings, children would better distinguish between God in his biological human 233 
form (Jesus) and God as a non-biological being. 234 
A further motivation was to examine children’s understanding of life-cycle processes.  235 
We used similar questions to the study by Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005), but added a 236 
question regarding children’s understanding of parentage, or whether children understand if a 237 
being had parents or not.  We analyzed each item individually to explore responses for each 238 
life-cycle trait. 239 
We hypothesized that Israeli children would be able to distinguish human from 240 
supernatural beings, and similar to Herrmann et al. (2010), all children would not need to 241 
initially anthropomorphize, or attribute life-cycle properties, to God. Children and adults may 242 
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resort to anthropomorphism (see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2015 for examples); at 243 
issue here is whether 3-to-five-year-olds categorically must anthropomorphize. 244 
Method 245 
Participants 246 
We tested 140 children. Sixty-four children were Modern Orthodox Jewish from 247 
Israel, and 76 children were from the UK, see Table 1 for age and gender breakdown.  Israeli 248 
children were recruited from Modern Orthodox Jewish synagogues and online newspapers 249 
and all identified themselves as Modern Orthodox Jewish.  British children were recruited 250 
from nurseries, church crèches, and toddler groups.  Five British children came from atheist 251 
backgrounds and the parents of nine children chose not to comment on their religious 252 
background.  All 14 of these children could mention something relevant about God, such as, 253 
“God answers prayers.” The rest of the children came from families who attended an 254 
Anglican church-affiliated group at least once each week.  At the end of the experiment, all 255 
children were asked to tell the experimenter something about God to ensure that they knew 256 
the referent of “God,” and all but one British child could do so. 257 
We also wanted to compare children’s responses with those of adults who have more 258 
mature biological understanding in addition to wider cultural understanding of supernatural 259 
beings.  We recruited 68 Israeli and 48 British adults, see Table 1 for age and gender 260 
descriptions.  The majority were parents of the children we tested.  Other adults were 261 
recruited via university advertisements (UK), through synagogues (Israel), and online 262 
newspapers (both). 263 
[Table 1 here] 264 
Procedure 265 
We asked participants a similar set of questions to Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005) but asked 266 
one additional question about parentage. Israeli and British children were questioned about a 267 
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Friend, their Mom, and God in counterbalanced order. The British sample was also asked 268 
about Jesus. Children were questioned about Jesus first and then asked about God to help 269 
children distinguish between the two. 270 
Children were asked five questions in counterbalanced order. 271 
1) Existence/longevity question: Each child was shown a picture of a velociraptor and a 272 
triceratops, and was asked if s/he could identify the animal.  “Dinosaur” was an 273 
acceptable answer. If the child could not identify the animal, the experimenter asked 274 
whether the child had ever heard of dinosaurs. If the answer was “no,” the child was 275 
not asked the dinosaur question.  If the answer was “yes,” the experimenter asked 276 
each child: “Right now there aren’t any dinosaurs in the world.  But a long time ago 277 
there were lots of dinosaurs in the world, like this [show picture].  Now what about 278 
[being]? Do you think [being] was alive when the dinosaurs were alive?”  The 279 
original study asked whether dinosaurs “exist” (Giménez-Dasí, et al., 2005).  We used 280 
“alive” because some researchers argue that the term “exist” is hard for children to 281 
understand (Emmons & Kelemen, 2014; Evans, 2008). 282 
2) Baby question: “A long time ago, were you ever a little baby, just like 283 
this?  [Experimenter shows child a newborn-size baby doll]. How about [being]? Was 284 
s/he a little baby a long time ago?”  285 
3) Aging question: “Let’s think about a moment a long, long time from now. What’s 286 
going to happen to [being] next year and the year after that? Do you think [being] will 287 
get older and older or will [being] stay the same?” “Getting older” and “Staying the 288 
same” were counterbalanced.  289 
4) Death question: “What will happen to [being] a long, long, time from now?  Will 290 
[being] die someday or will [being] go on living forever and ever?”  “Die” and “Live 291 
forever” were counterbalanced.   292 
CIRCLE OF LIFE  13 
 
 
5) Parentage question:  “Do you think [being] has a mom and dad?” 293 
We conducted all interviews in a child’s nursery or home.  294 
Similar to Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005) an index was created to determine whether a child 295 
attributed life-cycle traits to each being.  One point was given for each life-cycle trait 296 
attributed to each being.  If the child did not attribute a life-cycle trait, the child received a 297 
score of 0 for that item.  Thus, scores ranged from 0 (attributing no life-cycle traits to the 298 
being) to a score of 5 (attributing all life-cycle traits to the being).  All participant responses 299 
were included.  Children that responded, “I don’t know,” were given a score of .5 for that 300 
item.  All items for each agent moderately inter-correlated, αs > .55; thus, following analysis 301 
of the index, we analyzed each item individually.  Seven Israeli children and one British child 302 
answered, “I don’t know” to all “die” questions. One Israeli child did not know whether any 303 
being would grow old and one British child did not know whether any being had been a baby.  304 
Finally, one Israeli and two British children did not know whether any beings existed during 305 
the time of the dinosaurs. 306 
Results 307 
Understanding of the life-cycle across cultures 308 
We first explored whether children in two different cultures differentiate the life-cycle 309 
traits of human versus supernatural beings (as represented by the life-cycle index scores).  310 
Table 2 presents answer rates for each being, by age and cultural group.   Following 311 
Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005), we broke our sample into age groups.  Grouping each age by 312 
year allowed us to examine potential interactions between age, cultural group, and being.  A 3 313 
x 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with each being (3: Mom, Friend, and 314 
God) as the within-subject factor, and cultural group (2: British and Israeli children) and age 315 
(4: three-, four-, and five-year-olds, and adults) as the between-subjects.  Mauchly’s test 316 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, X²(2)= 121.55, p < .001, 317 
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therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 318 
sphericity. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of being, F(1.41, 320.63) 319 
=1099.32, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝2= .83; age, F(3, 227) =26.26, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2= .26; and cultural group, 320 
F(1, 227) =3.88, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝2= .02.  There were also interactions among responses regarding 321 
the life-cycle for each being and cultural group, F(1.41, 320.63) =27.07, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2= .11; 322 
among responses regarding the life-cycle for each being and age, F(4.24, 320.63) =104.64, p 323 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝2= .58; and an interaction in responses for each being, age, and cultural group, 324 
F(4.24, 320.63) =4.92, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2= .06.   325 
[Table 2 here] 326 
Differences in responses for each being by cultural group were explored through 327 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments, collapsing across age. These comparisons 328 
revealed that there was an effect of cultural group for life-cycle responses for Mom, p = .008, 329 
and God, p < .001, but there was no effect between cultural groups for responses for Friend, 330 
see Figure 1.  Israeli participants attributed more life-cycle attributes to Mom, M = 4.18, SD = 331 
.07, than did British participants, M = 3.92, SD = .07, and Israeli participants also attributed 332 
fewer life-cycle attributes to God, M = .76, SD = .09, than did British participants, M = 1.52, 333 
SD = .09. 334 
[Figure 1 here] 335 
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test with Bonferroni corrections were 336 
used to analyze differences in life-cycle index between age groups and being. Participants in 337 
each of three age groups were more likely to attribute life-cycle traits to Friend, Ms >3.11, 338 
and to Mom, Ms >2.95, than to God, Ms <1.92, ps <.001.  These distinctions increased with 339 
age.  Five-year-olds were significantly better at attributing life-cycle traits to both human 340 
beings, Ms >4.55 than 3-year-olds, Ms <3.11, and 4-year-olds, Ms <3.98, ps <.005.  341 
CIRCLE OF LIFE  15 
 
 
However, 5-year-olds were less likely to attribute life-cycle traits to God, M =.98 compared 342 
to 3-year-olds, M =1.92, p =.001.   343 
We further examined each age group against chance responding for these 344 
dichotomous questions (a test value of 2.5 out of 5 items), and results suggest that Israeli 345 
children of each age attributed life-cycle traits to human agents and culturally correct traits to 346 
God.  British children attributed life-cycle traits to the humans by age 4 and rejected them for 347 
God by age 5, see Figure 2. British three-year-olds significantly attributed more life-cycle 348 
traits than not to their Friend, but not to their Mom or to God. 349 
[Figure 2 here] 350 
Finally post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test with Bonferroni corrections 351 
were used to examine the interaction of cultural group, age, and being, see Table 2. Three- 352 
and 4-year-old Israeli children, were more likely to attribute to Mom more life-cycle 353 
attributes than British children.  Four- and 5-year-old Israeli children, were also less likely to 354 
attribute to God life-cycle traits than were British children.  No other significant differences 355 
were found. 356 
Ontological distinction between Jesus and God 357 
We also explored whether children and adults in a Christian context (UK) made 358 
different life-cycle attributions to Jesus and God. A 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA was 359 
conducted with each being (2: Jesus and God) as the within-subject factor, and age (4: 3-, 4-, 360 
5-year-olds, and adults) as the between-subject factor.  This analysis revealed a significant 361 
main effect of being, F(1, 69) =25.02, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝2= .27.  There was no interaction effect or 362 
a significant effect of age.  British children significantly differentiated between Jesus and 363 
God, t(71)= 4.62, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.09.  Children were less likely to attribute God with 364 
life-cycle properties, M = 1.98, SD = 1.39, than Jesus, M = 2.72, SD = .99. We used one-365 
sample t-tests (with 2.5 as a test value) to determine whether responses for Jesus and God 366 
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were significantly different from chance.  Responses for God were significantly below 367 
chance, suggesting that children correctly rejected life-cycle properties, t(71)= 3.21, p = .002, 368 
Cohen’s d = .76, but responses for Jesus did not significantly differ from chance, ns. Adults 369 
were significantly more likely to attribute life-cycle traits to Jesus, M = 3.07, SD = .69, than 370 
children, M = 2.72, SD = .99, t(114) =2.02, p =.046; and less likely to attribute life-cycle 371 
traits to God, M = .23, SD = .53, than were children, M = 1.98, SD = 1.36, t(113) =8.09, p < 372 
.001. 373 
 We ran binomial tests to examine children’s and adult’s responses for each item 374 
individually, see Table 3.  Only 5-year-olds consistently responded for 4 of 5 items and most 375 
ages were more likely to attribute babyhood and parentage to Jesus than other traits.  No age 376 
group (except adults) consistently responded regarding whether Jesus ages. 377 
 [Table 3 here] 378 
Children’s attributions of each life-cycle trait 379 
The life-cycle index served to demonstrate whether children generally attributed life-380 
cycle features to each entity, but the modest inter-correlations of these items suggest that they 381 
are not always attributed in concert. Hence, we analyzed children’s level of attribution of 382 
each life-cycle item individually using two-tailed binomial tests for each being, with each age 383 
and cultural group treated separately to test whether children attributed biologically correct 384 
traits to humans and culturally correct traits to God, see Table 4. All adults reliably attributed 385 
each life-cycle trait to the human agents and rejected each life-cycle trait for God.  Below we 386 
discuss children’s responses. 387 
[Table 4 here] 388 
Existence/longevity.  Older children were more likely to reliably appreciate that 389 
Friend and Mom did not exist during the time of the dinosaurs and were more likely to 390 
attribute existence during the time of the dinosaurs to God. 391 
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Parentage.  Overwhelmingly, children in both cultural groups regarded human beings 392 
as having parents. However, there were differences in responses for God between cultures.  393 
Israeli children of all ages reliably responded that God would not have parents but only 50% 394 
(32) of British children said that God did not have parents. 395 
Babyhood. The majority of children from both cultural groups understood that their 396 
friend had once been a baby, but only children older than four years reliably responded that 397 
Mom had once been a baby.  Similar to the parentage item, only Israeli children reliably 398 
responded that God had never been a baby whereas British children were at chance. 399 
Aging. Four- and five-year-olds in both cultural groups reliably attributed aging to a 400 
friend.  Overall, five-year-olds were more likely to respond that Mom would get older with 401 
age.  British three-year-olds also attributed their mom with never aging.  Only Israeli four- 402 
and five-year-olds responded reliably that God would not age.   403 
Death. By five years, children in both groups reliably responded that Mom and Friend 404 
would die.  By four years children could reliably respond that God would live forever.  405 
British three-year-olds also responded that their friend would never die. 406 
Discussion 407 
The present study provides evidence that children can distinguish beings that are 408 
subject to life-cycle processes from those that are not, and they can do so from an early age. 409 
Results also suggest that culture influences children’s attribution of life-cycle traits.  First we 410 
discuss results from the life-cycle index and then discuss individual life-cycle traits. 411 
Life-cycle index 412 
Contrary to prior results (Carey, 1995; Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; Inagaki & Hatano, 413 
1996), our results suggest that before age 5, British and Israeli children appropriately 414 
attributed life-cycle properties to humans and regarded God as separate from these biological 415 
processes.  Children did not necessarily resort to using anthropomorphism as a model nor did 416 
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children acquire an anthropomorphic perspective with age (Herrmann et al., 2010).  Instead 417 
children, especially older preschoolers, differentiated among humans and God for multiple 418 
life-cycle traits.  This differentiation is consistent with related evidence that suggests that 419 
young children and infants can distinguish animate from inanimate objects (Kuhlmeier, 420 
Bloom, & Wynn, 2004; Molina, Van de Walle, Condry, & Spelke, 2004) and living from 421 
non-living things (Heyman et al., 2003; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Saylor et al., 2010). Perhaps 422 
children reason initially according to agency, rather than anthropomorphism.  Children may 423 
not categorize beings as human or not, but whether or not they are agents.  Other work 424 
suggests that anthropomorphism may not be children's initial conceptual framework but 425 
that cultural input may encourage human-centered reasoning (Ganea, Canfield, Simons-426 
Ghafari, & Chou, 2014; Waxman, Hermann, Woodring, & Medin, 2014). 427 
Although children in this study could differentiate at an early age, Israeli children 428 
were less likely to attribute life-cycle traits to God than British counterparts.  This difference 429 
could be due to particular socio-cultural input and testimony (Harris & Koenig, 2006; Lane et 430 
al., 2012).  In Israel, children are taught about God’s all-powerful attributes. In contrast, 431 
British children may receive similar cultural input about God but also about Jesus, a human 432 
being that is God, but was born, had parents, grew older, and died. Understanding such a 433 
complex God concept may be very confusing and could have muddled children’s responses. 434 
To better characterize how socio-cultural input plays a role in understanding such a 435 
complex supernatural being, we questioned British children about Jesus and God.  To date, 436 
the extent to which socio-cultural input can conflate questions about the biological processes 437 
of God with the human characteristics of Jesus is unknown.  Thus, the aim of these questions 438 
was to determine whether children from a Christian context would differentiate between 439 
Jesus and God.  Unlike the children in the study by Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005), 440 
British children understood that God would not be subject to life-cycle processes.  Children at 441 
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all ages, however, responded at chance levels concerning Jesus.  However, individual item 442 
analyses of children’s responses showed that children were much more likely to attribute 443 
Jesus with having been a baby or having parents compared to aging, dying, or existing during 444 
the time of the dinosaurs.  This developmental pattern for Jesus was very similar to the 445 
attributions British children made to the human beings, suggesting that children understood 446 
cultural input and attributed Jesus with some human-like qualities. 447 
Individual analyses of life-cycle items 448 
Although children differentiated between God and humans concerning life-cycle 449 
traits, analyses of each item showed developmental variation. We examine these differences 450 
below.   451 
A notable difference is that three-year-olds were more likely to respond that their 452 
friend had been a baby and had parents above chance levels, whereas responses were at 453 
chance levels for a friend’s existence/longevity and aging. One possible explanation is that 454 
daily exposure to having parents, having siblings, and seeing other people with their children 455 
make the traits of parentage and babyhood obvious for children to attribute to human beings, 456 
especially compared to questions of existence, death, and aging. Another explanation is that 457 
the life-cycle traits of parentage and babyhood map onto different biological modes of 458 
construal than the traits of aging and death.  Indeed, babyhood and parentage may have more 459 
social associations than biological ones.  Future research should explore the relationship 460 
between these traits.  For example, more work is needed to investigate whether children 461 
understand the link between parentage and being a baby, as well as children’s understanding 462 
of reproduction (Emmons & Kelemen, 2014). A further possibility is that death, aging, and 463 
existence/longevity are more complex concepts.  Seventy percent of British and Israeli three-464 
year-olds reported that their friend would not die but go on living, and it was not until age 465 
five that most attributed eventual death, aging, and existence/longevity to both their friend 466 
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and mother at levels above chance. However, both populations significantly rejected eventual 467 
death for God by age 4. Our data are consistent with the claim that children do not develop a 468 
mature concept of death until later, between the ages of 5 to 7 years (Slaughter & Lyons, 469 
2003; Speece & Brent, 1984).  These results are also consistent with claims by many 470 
researchers (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bering, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005; Bloom, 2004, 471 
2007; Carey, 1985; Harris & Giménez, 2005) that folk psychology may interfere with a 472 
concept of death and existence/longevity (or a concept of pre-life, see Emmons and Kelemen, 473 
2014), and children may find the termination of epistemic states hard to imagine.  Even 474 
adults, who explicitly reject a life after death, answer that some psychological (but not 475 
biological) states continue after death (Bek & Lock, 2011; Bering, 2002; Huang, Cheng, & 476 
Zhu, 2013).  A further consideration is that when using familiar people, children may resist 477 
the idea that their friend or mother might die (Poling & Evans, 2004).  Future studies could 478 
try to tease apart whether responses reflect reluctance to think about the question, whether 479 
folk psychology is interfering, or whether children require development and knowledge to 480 
understand the concept of death, longevity, and aging.  A final limitation could be that our 481 
choice of the word “alive” for the longevity item was confusing: a “no” response may mean 482 
children attribute longevity to God, but a “yes” response could mean they attribute “life” to 483 
God.  484 
Conclusion 485 
These results suggest that 3-to-5-year-old children do not unswervingly 486 
anthropomorphize but have conceptual flexibility and can distinguish between supernatural 487 
and human beings. In addition, sociocultural input influences attribution of life-cycle traits.  488 
Further research is needed to understand how young children reason about the biological 489 
world, and in particular, how children understand the place of humans, other animals, and the 490 
variety of supernatural beings they encounter.  More cultural work is needed to understand 491 
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the variation or similarities of socio-cultural input that children receive regarding the 492 
biological (or non-biological) properties of human, animals, and supernatural beings.  An 493 
important goal would be to concentrate on the influences of early education, as well as 494 
cultural and religious beliefs and practices, on biological conceptual development. 495 
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Table 1. Description of gender, mean age, and age range of each age group by sample. 660 
  Gender Mean age (SD) Age range 
Sample Age group    
Israeli 3-year-olds 
(n = 23) 
12 females, 11 males 3 years; 3 months (.32) 2;10 – 3;11 
 4-year-olds 
(n = 17) 
10 females, 7 males 4 years; 4 months (.27) 4;0 – 4;10 
 5-year-olds 
(n = 24) 
14 females, 10 males 5 years; 2 months (.23) 5;0 – 5;6 
 Adults 
(n = 68) 
47 females, 21 males 37 years; 7 months (10.19) 26 - 88 
British 3-year-olds  
(n = 30) 
21 females, 9 males 3 years; 4 months (.32) 2;7 – 3;10 
 4-year-olds  
(n = 24) 
14 females, 10 males 4 years, 4 months (.28) 4;0 – 4;11 
 5-year-olds 
(n = 22) 
16 females, 6 males 5 years, 4 months (.31) 5;0 – 5;11 
 Adults 
(n = 48) 
39 females, 9 males 32 years; 10 months (8.32) 20 – 62 
Note: There were significantly more females than males in the British sample, t(141) = 5.54, p < .001.  661 
However, analyses showed no gender effects for any analyses in the results. 662 
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Table 2.   678 
Means and Standard Deviations of Life-cycle Scores for each Being by Age and Cultural 679 
Group. 680 
 Friend Mom God 
 British Israeli British Israeli British Israeli 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Age group       
3 (n = 53) 
4 (n = 41) 
5 (n = 46) 
3.10 (1.03)** 
3.83 (1.05)** 
4.41 (0.85)** 
3.09 (1.16)* 
3.88 (1.05)** 
4.63 (0.71)** 
2.70 (0.88) 
3.58 (1.18)** 
4.50 (0.74)** 
3.13 (0.97)* 
3.82 (1.24)** 
4.46 (0.66)** 
2.30 (1.29) 
2.25 (1.42) 
1.45 (1.26)** 
1.91 (1.20)** 
0.82 (0.88)** 
0.75 (1.26)** 
Adults (n = 46) 5.00 (1.05)** 4.96 (0.21)** 5.00 (0.00)** 4.97 (0.35)** 0.23 (0.53)** 0.06 (0.24)** 
Note. Significantly different from chance (test value 2.5 out of 5 items) by t-test, *p < .05, 681 
**p < .001. 682 
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Table 3.  699 
Percentage of Attributed Life-Cycle Trait Responses for Jesus by British Children. 700 
 Existence/ 
Longevity+ 
% 
Parentage 
 
% 
Babyhood 
 
% 
Aging 
 
% 
Death 
 
% 
3 years (n = 30) 50.0 76.7* 53.3 46.7 43.3 
4 years (n = 22) 77.3* 77.3* 77.3* 54.5 40.9 
5 years (n = 20) 65.0** 95.0** 80.0* 60 85** 
Adult (n = 46) 76.1** 97.8** 100** 90.1** 100** 
*p < .01, **p < .0001, + Higher scores for this item reflect responses that the being would not 701 
be alive during the time of the dinosaurs. 702 
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Table 4.   721 
 722 
Percentage of Attributed Life-Cycle Trait Responses by Age and Cultural Group for Being 723 
 724 
 Existence/ 
longevity++ 
Parentage Babyhood Aging Death 
 British Israeli British Israeli British Israeli British Israeli British Israeli 
 % % % % % % % % % % 
Friend  
3 (n = 53) 
4 (n = 41) 
5 (n = 46) 
60 
58.3 
95.5** 
52.2 
70.6 
91.7** 
90** 
100** 
100** 
91.3** 
94.1** 
100** 
80* 
91.7** 
72.7+ 
73.9* 
70.6 
87.5** 
50 
87.5** 
95.5** 
65.2 
88.2* 
95.8** 
30* 
45.8 
77.3** 
30.4 
64.7 
87.5** 
Adults  
(n = 46) 
100** 95.6** 100** 100** 100** 100** 100** 100** 100** 100** 
Mom  
3 (n = 53) 
4 (n = 41) 
5 (n = 46) 
Adults  
(n = 46) 
50 
70.8 
95.5** 
100** 
47.8 
76.5* 
86.5** 
97.7** 
86.7** 
95.8** 
100** 
100** 
82.6* 
82.4* 
95.8** 
100** 
60 
83.3* 
77.3* 
100** 
65.9 
82.4* 
83.3* 
100** 
26.7* 
58.2 
95.5** 
100** 
69.6 
70.6 
91.7** 
100** 
46.7 
50 
81.8** 
100** 
43.5 
70.6 
87.5** 
100** 
God  
3 (n = 53) 
4 (n = 41) 
5 (n = 46) 
Adults  
(n = 46) 
43.3 
16.7** 
9.1** 
0** 
56.5 
29.4 
4.2** 
5.8** 
56.7 
54.2 
36.4 
2.1** 
17.4* 
5.9** 
8.3** 
0** 
36.7 
66.7 
50 
15.5** 
30.4 
0** 
16.7* 
0** 
53.3 
62.5 
40.9 
8.8** 
56.5 
23.5* 
29.2+ 
0** 
40 
25* 
9.1** 
0** 
43.5 
23.5* 
16.7** 
0** 
Note: + p = .06; * p < .05; ** p < .00, Significantly different from chance (test value .5 out of 725 
1) by binomial test,; ++Higher scores for this item reflect responses that the being would not 726 
be alive during the time of the dinosaurs. 727 
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Figure Captions  739 
Figure 1. Life-Cycle score (out of 5) using standard error bars for each being according to 740 
cultural group. 741 
Figure 2. Life-Cycle score (out of 5) for each age group. 742 
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Figure 1. 764 
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Figure 2. 781 
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